







#### **VIBRATIONS CREATE SOUND**

- × The strings on a guitar vibrate.
- The vibration makes a soundwave.
- The soundwave pushes the air molecules and eventually reaches our ears.

#### THE SOUND DEPENDS ON....

- × The length of the string.
- How it was set into motion (plucked, strummed, tapped, etc).
- × The shape and composition of the string.
- We can *mathematicize* a vibrating guitar string.

**MATHEMATICIZATION OF A UIBRATING STRING** $u_{tt}(x,t) = u_{xx}(x,t)$  (the wave equation)u(0,t) = u(L, t) = 0 (the ends don't move)u(x,0) = f(x) (how the string is set in motion) $u_t(x,0) = 0$  (not moving at t=0)

#### **MULTIVARIABLE CALCULUS???**

× The function u(x,t) is the height of the string at time = t, position = x.

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v depends on *two independent variables*.

# MULTIVARIABLE -> SINGLE VARIABLE ???

- How could we turn this into problem(s) for function(s) that depend on one variable only?
- × Discuss!

#### **SEPARATION OF VARIABLES**

- × See if we can somehow build a solution from one-dimensional problems...
- x T"(t) X(x) = X"(x) T(t) ... re-arrange ...
- × T(t) X(0) = 0, T(t) X(L) = 0 means?

#### WE NOW LOOK FOR ....

- functions that satisfy X"(x) = c X(x),
  where c can be any real number.
- × also need X(0) = X(L) = 0.
- × can you find some real numbers c and functions X?

#### THE SPECTRUM

Solutions are

$$X_n(x) = \sin\left(\frac{n\pi x}{L}\right) with -\lambda_n = n^2 \pi^2 / L^2$$

The numbers  $\lambda_n = n^2 \pi^2 / L^2$  are eigenvalues.

The set of all eigenvalues is *the spectrum*.

#### FREQUENCIES

The spectrum determines the frequencies of vibration of the string.

$$\frac{\pi^2}{L^2}, \frac{4\pi^2}{L^2}, \frac{9\pi^2}{L^2}, \frac{16\pi^2}{L^2}, \dots$$

If L is shorter, these numbers get bigger....

# HEARING THE LENGTH OF A STRING

Shorter strings make higher notes.

Longer strings make lower notes.

We can see this in the guitar solo...



# HOW CAN WE BE SURE THESE ARE ALL?

- × Fourier 1768–1830
- × Could there be more?
- × How to get u(x,t)???



# **GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATION OF FUNCTIONS**

- × 1862–1943
- infinite dimensional vector space with scalar product
- × Hilbert space



# **ORTHOGONAL BASIS FOR HILBERT SPACE**

- × The functions  $X_n(x) = \sin\left(\frac{n\pi x}{L}\right)$  are an OB for a Hilbert space that contains all solns.
- Expand any function in that space using them...



 $\mathbf{u}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sin\left(\frac{n\pi x}{L}\right) \cos\left(\frac{n\pi t}{L}\right) f_n$ 

$$f_n = \frac{4}{L^2} \int_0^L f(x) \sin\left(\frac{n\pi x}{L}\right) dx$$

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THE EQUATION FOR A REAL GUITAR REQUIRES MORE SOPHISTICATED GEOMETRIC ANALYSIS ©





# GAME THEORY

Mathematics that can explain why people and animals act they way they do!



#### **MATHEMATICIZATION!**

	Player 1 Rock	Player 1 Paper	Player 1 Scissors
Player 2 Rock	(0, 0)	(-1, 1)	(1, -1)
Player 2 Paper	(1, -1)	(0, 0)	(-1, 1)
Player 2 Scissors	(-1, 1)	(1, -1)	(0, 0)

#### PURE AND MIXED STRATEGIES

- \* Pure strategies are doing one thing all the time.
- Mixed strategies are doing each of the pure strategies with a certain frequency.
- × Payoff depends on all (mixed) strategies.

#### **GEOMETRIZATION**

- (r, p, s) probabilitiesfor player 1.
- ×  $(\rho, \pi, \sigma)$  probabilities for player 2.
- × calculate payoffs!



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#### EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY



No player can increase their payoff by changing their strategy, while other players keep their strategies fixed.

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# **EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES EXIST!**

- × JF Nash, 1950
- × Nobel prize 1994
- × A beautiful mind
- × Abel prize 2015
- × Embedding theorem









#### PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Two prisoners are caught for a crime.

They agreed to remain silent.

Will they keep their promise or rat each other out?

Discuss!



#### **MATHEMATICIZATION**

R=reward payoff for cooperating
P=punishment payoff for mutual
defection
T=temptation payoff
S=sucker's payoff
S <p<r<t< td=""></p<r<t<>

Strategy	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	(R, R)	(S, T)
Defect	(T, S)	(P, P)

# EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY?

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	(0, 0)	(-10, -2)
Defect	(-2, -10)	(-5, -5)



### **APPLICATION: THE CLIMATE DILEMMA**

- If China reduces emissions but USA doesn't, USA profits (T), China loses (S).
- × If both don't reduce emissions, both (P).
- × If both reduce emissions both (R).
- × S<P<R<T

### **MATHEMATICIZATION**

Strategy	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	(R, R)	(S, T)
Defect	(T, S)	(P, P)



#### **EVOLUTION OF BEHAVIORS**

- × x is frequency of cooperating countries
- × 1-x is frequency of defecting
- replicator equation predicts evolution of behavior (cooperation or not)

#### **REPLICATOR EQUATION**

$$\dot{x} = x \begin{bmatrix} xR + (1-x)S - x(xR + (1-x)S) \\ -(1-x)(xT + (1-x)P) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= -x(1-x)[x(T-R) + (1-x)(P-S)] \le 0.$$





# THERE IS SOME HOPE ... THE OPTIMAL REPLICATOR EQUATION



# **EVOLUTION WITH TWO MECHANISMS**

- countries choose selfishly at a fast time scale
- but at a long time scale, global populations with the higher final average fitness are favored

# PROBLEM IN OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY

<u>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-20426-w</u>

$$2P \leq T \leq 2R$$

if this eqn holds, evolution towards cooperation.





# **ECONOMICS** decision making, business strategies

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human behaviors and consequences

