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MASCULINITIES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

Exploring ecomodern, industrial and ecological masculinity

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Introduction

The world is facing monumental challenges, including the spread of neo-fascism in Europe, world hunger and an unfair distribution of wealth in which a few per cent own as much as all the others (Piketty 2014). At the same time also faced is the very real possibility of the destruction of our common planet, as we know it. As gender scholars are aware: men in general are a big problem, especially white, middle-class, and rich men – those who travel too much, eat too much meat and live in energy consuming buildings (Nightingale 2006; Terry 2009). Following the solutions these men propose to handle climate change is akin to having an alcoholic draft drinking laws.

This chapter deals with historically shaped discourses and contemporarily enacted forms of masculinities in rich, extractive dependent countries with high per capita emissions. The empirics are drawn from Sweden. Since the late 1960s and the 1972 UN conference on the global environment in Stockholm, Sweden has claimed to be, and has also been widely recognized as, one, if not even *the* most environmentally progressive countries in the world by prominent scholars (Giddens 2009; Jänicke 2008; Urry 2011). This analysis will move beyond that stereotype as well as beyond binary categories of wo/men when searching for problems and proposing solutions, also making visible the difference among masculinities (Alaimo 2009). Of course, if we divide humans into well-confined categories and analyse per capita emissions and ecological footprints (e.g. Råty & Carlsson-Kanyama 2010) the truth is that white, middle-class, rich men are the problem. This is important research to keep in mind. But, in our analysis, masculinities are understood as always-in-the-making within and part of material-semiotic antagonistic discourses, which are the embodied nature of knowledge, materiality, meaning and power. Masculinities are

not fixed in biological terms, but shift according to various tensions in cultural and political material-semiotic discourses with bodies populating and changing such discourses (see Christensen & Jensen 2014).

Making masculinities visible in climate change politics

Almost all of the research on gender and climate change has been carried out in poor nations with low emissions per capita (Arora-Jonsson 2014). Especially prominent and enlightening has been gender analysis in relation to women affected by climate change (Neumayer & Plümper 2007) and female activism (Macgregor 2013). Of much less interest has been the male aspect, especially the question of how different masculinities enhance or influence environmental issues. While there has been research into gender roles and inequalities in relation to environmental and developmental goals, there has been little concern with constructions of hegemonic masculinity when examining how masculinity is embedded in and through environmental policy (Hultman 2013). A large field called masculinity studies from the 1990s has been evolving around the issue of different configurations of materiality, values and practices among men. Unexpectedly few scholars have thus far been interested in continuing the analysis of masculinities and environment that environmental historian Carolyn Merchant and particularly Raewyn Connell started in the 1980s. This lacuna of studies of male practices in rich fossil fuel dependent countries is surprising, not only because of the large role that men play in environmental politics, but also because one of the first studies in which the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” was used and which started the blooming field of masculinity studies dealt with men and transitional masculinity in environmental social movements (Connell 1990). Merchant, in the classic book *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (1980), initiated the analysis of nature-destructive masculinity. That perspective was somewhat lost, taken for granted or suppressed later on. After this book and others with the same theme perhaps men, as nature-destructive industrial masculinity, were firmly understood as doing bad (Shiva 1988). Thereby masculine practices shaping the environment were not closely analysed even though this is also an important part of gender and environmental studies (Alaimo 2012). The environmental political field thus has a paucity of masculinity studies (Dymén, Andersson & Langlais 2013). This chapter and currently ongoing research in this direction is thus an attempt to balance the situation.

Method and analytic categories

The analysis of masculinities in this chapter is based on a set of 3,500 articles found in the database Retriever using keywords such as climate change and greenhouse gas. The database contains articles published in all Swedish newspapers, all major regional newspapers and the vast majority of magazines. Once the material was compiled and arranged chronologically, as well as read through, it was sorted with discourse

analytic tools (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a). Exploring different configurations of masculinity and climate change should shed further light on how the genders interact and are structured in the climate change debate. In so doing, this text both elaborates on a fairly new framework and broadens our understanding of the cultural formation of these configurations in the present form of global politics.

This chapter categorizes gender aspects of environmental positions as exhibiting one of three main tendencies: “industrial masculinity”, “ecological masculinity” and “ecomodern masculinity”. This chapter build on work Hultman has done conceptualizing masculinities with his more than a decade long research into climate change, environmental history and energy politics to shape the forms of configurations that we re-use in this chapter (Hultman *forthcoming*). The ecomodern masculinity is the one that dominates today’s climate change debate. This masculinity was part of the shift from the 1990s towards the recognition of environmental issues as an intrinsic part of politics for the future. Ecomodern masculinity can be defined as an asymmetric combination of determination and hardness from industrial modernity with appropriate moments of compassion and even vulnerability for the environment from the environmental movement in which the end result is merely ‘green washing’, as exemplified by Arnold Schwarzenegger (Hultman 2013). The ecomodern masculine character demonstrates caring and responsibility for the environment, while at the same time promoting economic growth and technological expansion. Ecomodern masculinity demonstrates an in-depth recognition of environmental problems, especially climate change, while at the same time supporting policies and technologies that conserve the structures of climate-destroying systems (Hultman *forthcoming*).

Industrial masculinity is a figuration that historically has been noted – by, for example, Merchant (1980) – as treating nature as both scary and a resource for extraction. Man has been presented as the chosen dominator, and engineering as the method of creating wealth for all humans. Talk in the climate change debate about a vulnerable earth transformed by anthropogenic emissions is handled with denial or strong scepticism by those enacting industrial masculinity, since in their idea the world is there for humans to conquer and extract resources from. This is a marginalized position today taken by climate skeptics, although one perhaps simmering just below the surface, and is a much larger part of climate politics than is seen in the debate (Anshelm & Hultman 2014b).

The most marginalized masculinity in the climate change debate today is ecological masculinity. This evolved in the 1960s as antagonism to industrial masculinity. It incorporated practices such as the localization of economies, use of small-scale technologies, creation of renewable energy, decentralization of power structures and cohabitation with nature in everyday life (Connell 1990). Ecological masculinity today plays a small part in our present global climate change debate and is upheld by, for example, actors within MenEngage, 350.org or indigenous social movements such as We Speak Earth and Idle No More.

We have started off this chapter by giving a background to the field and continued with presenting our method as well as the analytical concepts we are using.

We will now present the climate change debate and its discourses before we discuss the masculinities part of that debate.

Climate change debate

Masculinities of climate change need to be situated within a broader history. Energy and environmental politics in fossil fuel dependent rich countries over the last forty years are characterized by an intense conflict between an ecological discourse and a dominating industrial discourse that were both shoved to the periphery of the debate in the early 1990s as an ecomodern discourse began to dominate both national and international policies on energy, climate and environment (Hultman & Yaras 2012). Until 2006 the majority of politicians and other elite actors more or less treated climate change as just one of several environmental issues and as something to keep an eye on in the future (Zannakis 2015). This approach prevailed despite grave warnings from environmental organizations, individual researchers, research communities and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which stated as far back as 1990 that this was an issue not to be treated lightly (Knaggård 2014). This way of handling global climate change was about to change dramatically.

From the autumn of 2006 through 2009, the issue of global climate change was at the core of politics, and climate change was reinforced by both research and increased environmental activism: economist Nicolas Stern's report on climate change costs, Al Gore's film, "An Inconvenient Truth", and the publication of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)'s fourth report on global climate change made the issue urgent (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a). This was compounded by news reports in early 2007 in which the consequences of climate change – including melting ice, droughts and record summer heat in Southern Europe – on people and cultures were a recurring topic. Convincing and worrisome arguments emerged that climate change was an issue that needed to be taken very seriously and be considered in every political decision. The challenging framing at this time made it necessary to talk about the good society, the need for responsibility to future generations and the need to prevent climate catastrophe. It turned into an antagonistic dispute over what future society should look like that none could ignore.

The newspapers displayed a profound concern for the future, and it is significant that *Dagens Nyheter* portrayed this in a long series of articles entitled "Climate anxiety". *Aftonbladet*, in turn, called upon its readers to sign a petition to stop climate change and regularly announced how many people had followed the call. From the autumn of 2006 climate change took a central place in public political debate in Sweden. All of the parliamentary parties, as well as interest groups ranging from the Swedish Enterprise Organization to the Swedish Church, identified ambitious climate actions as a prerequisite for the survival of industrial civilization. Even though the urgency of climate change was understood in quite a similar way by almost all actors, the understanding of the causes and adequate solutions were far from the

same and we will here discuss the four discourses that made up the debate, and which we have written extensively about elsewhere (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a).

The industrial fatalist discourse

The Swedish and global climate change debate is dominated by liberal-conservative ideas put forward together by actors from political parties, industry, liberal press and trade unions. During the years 2006 to 2009, one image of Sweden, as competitive, environmentally friendly and courageous, dominated. Sweden was said to be a country showing international leadership by example, and this drove a permeating fundamental belief that international agreements between states would make it possible to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases and, therefore, manage the risks of climate change.

For these actors only marginal changes to industrial capitalist society's fundamental economic and technical structures would be needed. Climate change was described as a temporary crisis phenomenon that required a complicated coordination of international efforts that had never been seen before. The climate crisis for industrial fatalists was described as a new market opportunity in which better-informed consumers create bigger markets. Climate change is thus incorporated smoothly into industrial modern growth-centred politics, where it is described as an "economic lever" for growth, enterprise and jobs. The solutions, however, were said to be large-scale nuclear power, a carbon market and flexible mechanisms. Since Sweden was already doing well according to this discourse other citizens in other countries were the real problem; even the poorest who wanted to include environmental justice were pointed out as a disturbance at the COP negotiations and described as rioting children.

The green Keynesianism discourse

The influential, but not dominating, green Keynesianism discourse was in some respects very different to the industrial fatalist discourse, even though they both shared a core belief in market mechanisms. Green Keynesianism made a rather profound reflection on the industrial capitalist mode of action. System modifications, behavioural changes and fundamental value changes were reported to be necessary to meet climate change. Such changes clarified that economic models must be reformed, growth concepts reclassified, ecological considerations internalized and a gentler approach to nature developed, and that demands for global justice be respected. Changes of this kind could not solely be left to the market, which is why policies responsible for promoting these changes were of great importance in the green Keynesianism discourse.

In Sweden, this required comprehensive changes in energy, transport and production systems towards sources of renewable energy, rail mass transit and energy efficient production. The green Keynesianism discourse emphasized the importance of binding international agreements. Sweden needed to implement its own

policy of action before it could make demands on other countries. Actors used an ecomodern language that referred to the “untapped potential” of green jobs to save both the economy and the climate. The core idea was to stimulate consumption and investments towards a greener future with massive government stimulus, including a “green new deal” for Europe, without really questioning the overall consumption patterns or lifestyles in rich fossil fuel dependent countries.

The climate skeptic discourse

There was in Sweden a small group of climate skeptics. This group consisted, with only a few exceptions, of elderly men with elite positions in society either in academia or in large private companies. Even though they had a positivist standpoint, in relation to climate science a constructivist position was adopted and they described themselves as marginalized, banned and oppressed dissidents who felt compelled to speak up against what they saw to be a faith-based belief in climate science. They argued that the IPCC deliberately constructed its models in an alarmist direction and appealed to citizens’ mistrust of the state and the establishment in a populist way. In this way, the climate skeptic discourse quite paradoxically shaped a conflict between the people and the decision makers; between concrete, short-term and individual everyday problems on one hand and long-term, abstract and global issues on the other. Climate science for them was a thought-up construct with political goals. This position was paradoxical, because these men themselves were part of the elite, having been part of the ruling class their whole lives with successful careers in modern industrial society. They found many spaces to speak out and their arguments were disseminated through various types of media even though for them media climate reporting was brainwashing the whole world.

The eco-socialist discourse

The fourth discourse in Sweden in regards to climate change took the position that the research regarding climate change was real and that transformative action was required. Its starting point was that climate research is valid, but it hesitated to speak out regarding the consequences of a warming world, or discuss who the main emitters are. Climate justice is central in terms of both historical and contemporary differences in emissions and gains. There is a need for another relationship between nature and culture than the current extractivist form. Civil disobedience and direct action are recognized as important forms of politics in the name of the planet. This is a sidelined group, rarely even mentioned in mass media, government reports or so forth, that wants systemic change, not climate change. For eco-socialists climate change is the clearest sign of capitalism’s inherent self-destructiveness. Its solutions are the localization of fossil dependent societies in which grassroots movements are crucial. For these eco-socialists it was somewhat absurd to discuss changes in individual consumption patterns while paying no attention at all to the capitalist system that demanded increased consumption. The possibility for change grew from a

TABLE 2.1 Climate discourses and masculinities

<i>Discourse</i>	<i>Masculinities</i>
Industrial fatalism	Ecomodern
Green Keynesianism	Ecomodern
Climate skeptics	Industrial
Ecosocialist	Ecological

Source: Anshelm & Hultman (2014a).

global non-parliamentary grass-roots movement that, to some extent, affirmed the use of civil disobedience and direct action. The eco-socialist discourse described the outline of an alternative society, not just an alternative technology.

Eco-socialists said that the dominant climate politics of industrial fatalism and green Keynesianism were fake politics designed to assure citizens that everything was under control. They criticized the dominant environmental movement organizations for their gradual adaptation to the political and economic growth agenda. Management of resources should be done within planetary boundaries, they argued. Organic food needed to become a part of everyday life, and carbon rationing, as a morally good action, should become popular (Jonstad 2009).

Ecomodern masculinity

The first configuration of masculinity to play a role in shaping global climate change is ecomodern masculinity. The ecomodern discourse has enabled economic growth to be placed back squarely at the centre of the environmental debate, and it claims that there is no conflict between economic growth and environmental problems. In fact, it declares that environmental problems actually foster growth, innovation and competitiveness (Hajer 1996; Hultman & Nordlund 2013). The ecomodern discourse – or ecological modernization as it has been called elsewhere – emphasizes a continuation of industrial modernization instead of a hegemonic shift, and it brought major changes to energy and environmental policies in the early 1990s that still figure in environmental politics today. Ecomodern masculinity is part of this dominant ecomodern discourse.

Greening of modernity

Ecomodern masculinity is part of both the industrial fatalism and green Keynesianism discourses of global climate change (Anshelm & Hultman 2014b). Both discourses today say that there is no immediate need to change industrial capitalist society's fundamental economic and technical structures in order to combat climate change. Climate change politics was presented as a competition and Sweden portrayed as competitive and a courageous frontrunner country in a global environmental race. This is an image not restricted to Sweden. Politicians and actors in the climate

change debate all over the world try to pose as the most environmentally friendly (Boykoff 2011; Carvalho 2007).

In the industrial fatalist approach significant changes to industrial society's way of life, economic growth, the use of natural resources, the production of energy and goods, transportation, the flow of materials or any other aspect of industrial society's metabolism, are unnecessary or even counter-productive to dealing with climate change. The green Keynesianism discourse has a slightly different approach. It contains the classic social democratic confidence in the market as the engine of wealth creation but only if the market is properly regulated by strong government enforcement to reduce inherent dysfunctions (Jackson 2011). Proponents argue that economic models must be reformed, growth concepts reclassified, ecological considerations internalized, a gentler approach to nature developed and demands for global justice respected. These seemingly different ways of performing eco-modern discourse were understood early on by Hajer (1996), who wrote that ecological modernization could be executed and understood both as a technocratic project (industrial fatalism) and institutional learning (green Keynesianism).

One of mankind's most important decisions

Men in Sweden from the Liberal-Conservative government as well as the Social Democratic Party, Green Party and most of the Left Party enacted ecomodern masculinities. Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt from the conservative political party Moderaterna stressed that the upcoming 2009 Copenhagen negotiations on global climate change meant that we all faced "one of mankind's most important decisions" and that it was Sweden's task to "show leadership and take the initiative". He stressed in the speech that he had learned to "respect" that human behaviour in large regions of the world was unsustainable, that he understood the global warming threat and that it required political decisions to manage it (Reinfeldt 2008).

With ecomodern masculinity the primary solution to climate change was new technology –not very different from the technology in systems that caused the problems. Emissions from the transport system were not a problem of having a private car, for example – it was the emissions of that particular car that were the problem. A fundamental, unrestricted and under-problematized confidence in rationality and progress characterized the reaction to the dangers that industrial civilization had brought upon itself (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a).

The Prime Minister and his allies declared several times that Sweden should be a "prototype", "leading country" and "good example", and had the obligation to "show leadership and take the lead" (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a). The government declared that Sweden's ability to combine low emissions with economic growth ought to convince other countries that emission decreases do not jeopardize national economies but are actually a prerequisite for continued industrial and economic development. In this fashion the government, with heavy support from the daily press, created a narrative about Sweden as a frontrunner in an international competition of climate politics.

Asymmetric combination

According to enactors of ecomodern masculinity only minor corrections are needed to deal with global climate change. The answer to the crisis created by industrial modernization was more industrial modernization with ecological conditions taken into consideration. There was consequently no crisis of the system, only marginal dysfunctions that could be managed through innovation, new knowledge, improved information, enlightenment and so on.

Sweden has invested heavily in hydro power and nuclear power over the years, and more recently in bio energy. As a result, the country today, if some well curated statistics are used, has low carbon emissions in relation to its GDP. This is only the case, however, provided that the emissions related to the vast consumption of goods produced abroad are not taken into consideration, and that ecological footprints as a measurement are generally disregarded. Sweden's position as a front-runner in GHG reductions is based on dammed rivers, racialized politics against the Indigenous Sámi population, large farms of industrialized forests and heavy investment in nuclear power not reflected upon by ecomodern masculinity. Moreover, Swedes export low-carbon technology and import high-carbon consumer products in order to maintain the national standard of living, enhance economic growth and decrease emissions (Lidskog & Elander 2012). Some call this a progressive national politics that leads the way in the global combat against climate change and climate mitigation. Others would simply call it an obvious asymmetry that outsources its environmental problems while claiming moral superiority on the issue of climate change.

Industrial masculinity

The second masculinity to be discussed here is industrial masculinity. Industrial masculinity has a strong foothold in the world as shown by, for example, Carolyn Merchant (1980, 1996). In the climate change debate this figuration is seen most clearly when analysing climate skeptics. The mere talk in climate debate about a vulnerable earth transformed by anthropogenic emissions is handled with denial or strong scepticism by those enacting industrial masculinity.

Making modernity

Industrial masculinity contains values from engineering and economics and favours large-scale and centralized energy technologies and the practice of patriarchy. In relation to nature the most important idea is to separate it from humans and value it as a resource for human extraction. Carolyn Merchant identified a kind of masculinity that accuses others of religious fervour at the same time that it uses faith as a basis for its embrace of a modern industrial society. Since the Enlightenment, a separation between man/woman and culture/nature has been created that leads to the dichotomy of men/culture as rulers over women/nature.

Merchant detects an important change from organic metaphors of nature, which were dominant up until the sixteenth century in Europe, to mechanical metaphors; eventually nature was regarded as building blocks useful for the purpose of creating a human-made Eden on Earth. This shift coincided with the rise of industrial-scale operators who viewed nature as a resource – the mining, water and timber industries, for example (1980).

Climate skepticism

In the twenty-first century, industrial masculinity forms the basis for climate skepticism. When industrial modernization once again was truly challenged in the wake of the climate change debate, industrial masculinity in the form of climate skepticism appeared on the environmental political scene again (Anshelm & Hultman 2014b). McCright and Dunlap (2003) identify the conservative political movement in the US as a central actor that is influenced by a small group of “dissident” or “contrarian” scientists who lend credentials and authority to conservative think tanks. It is well recognized that in order to maintain an illusion of intense controversy, industries, special interest groups and public relations firms have manipulated climate science and exploited the US media. This is not a social movement; it is a project of a few influential men (Lahsen 2013). In research based on Gallup surveys in the US McCright and Dunlap (2011), who take gender into consideration in their analysis, have found a correlation between self-reported understanding of global warming and climate change denial among conservative white men. This suggests that climate change denial is a form of identity-protective cognition. This skepticism is articulated in Sweden by a small, homogeneous group of, almost exclusively, men and conservative think tanks. These men have successful careers in academia or private industry, strong beliefs in a market society and a great mistrust of government regulation (Anshelm & Hultman 2014b).

The skeptics’ arguments are strengthened by references to the authority of titles found in a variety of academic disciplines and thereby demonstrate a general belief in the positivistic industrial modern science underpinning these academic disciplines. In relation to climate science, however, these skeptics adopt a constructivist position. They dismiss climate-science as a mix of science and politics so entwined that they can no longer be distinguished (Anshelm & Hultman 2014b).

In Sweden skeptics have connections to associations where representatives of business, scientific and technology research meet. One clear example is of Per-Olof Eriksson, a former board member of Volvo and former president of the multinational steel company Sandvik, who wrote an article in the leading Swedish business paper *Dagens Industri* declaring his doubts that carbon emissions affect the climate. He said that the Earth’s average temperature has risen due to natural variations (Eriksson 2008). Ingemar Nordin, professor of philosophy of science, continued by saying that the IPCC’s selection and review of scientific evidence was consistent with what politicians wanted. Nordin claimed that politics shaped basic scientific research, and that only scientists who submitted politically acceptable

truths were awarded funding (2008). Economy Professors Marian Radetzki and Nils Lundgren claimed that the IPCC deliberately constructed their models 'in an alarmist direction' using feedback mechanisms that gave the impression that significant climate change was taking place (2009). Later on fifteen Swedish professors, all men, proclaimed themselves as climate skeptics (Einarsson et al. 2008).

Their rhetoric is a typical patriarchal line in which men, particularly, with engineering and/or science backgrounds claim to have the knowledge to care for an ill-educated working class and developing nations (Anshelm 2010). Instead of understanding climate skeptics as anti-science or anti-political, we argue that it is important to understand how their masculine identity has been shaped and how this figuration is co-constructed with the challenges they make towards climate science.

They make use of faith-based conservative rhetoric which has a long tradition among industrial engineers, economists and scientists (overwhelmingly male fields), as witnessed in the debate over nuclear power in which the coming nuclear age was described as a Garden of Eden. In Sweden the first reactor was named Adam and the second Eve; engineers even told their building as a religious story in which Eve was created from the rib of Adam (Anshelm 2010). The connection between Christian faith and the masculine control of nature goes back even further, over several hundred years. Their rationality of domination over nature, instrumentality, economic growth and linearity has been hegemonic throughout the industrial modern era (Merchant 1996).

Ecological masculinity

We have looked at the ecomodern and industrial masculinities. The third figuration we will analyse in connection to global climate change is that of ecological masculinity, which today plays a sidelined role in the climate change debate. The localization of economies, use of small-scale technologies, creation of renewable energy, decentralization of power structures and cohabitation with nature were proposed by an ecological masculinity as activities that should be part of everyday practices.

Entangled nature

From the mid-1970s onwards, criticism has – with various degrees of success – been raised against modern industrial society's flaws and shortcomings, including a challenge to industrial masculinity (Melosi 1987; Rome 2003). A vision of another society was then formulated and practised; these visions, challenging the dominant modern industrial energy and environmental politics, were seriously discussed throughout the 1980s. The rise of the Green Party in the parliamentary assembly, new regulations and small-scale renewable energy projects are examples of this change. This vision was against large-scale industrial socio-technical solutions and in favour of small-scale renewables and decentralization. In opposition to large segments of the

political and scientific elite, initiatives such as eco-villages, labelling requirements, and cooperative wind and solar projects were begun (Hultman 2014a). Existing knowledge about society's impact could now be translated into practical projects and arranged in new kinds of communities. These change agents did not shut themselves off from society, but created alternative projects amidst the dominant model. During this period, a masculinity of a more caring, humble and sharing sort was presented as being more adequate to an ecologically sound society. This masculinity was created, among other places, within the environmental movement that challenged the hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1990).

In the recent years of the climate change debate ecological masculinity has merged with ideas from Indigenous people, eco-socialism and Transition Towns to make up an important association (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a). The central idea was that the problem of climate change could not be resolved without creating a different global socio-ecological system. Ecological masculinity was intertwined with a discourse that rested on the assumption that climate change is a productive force that fosters change in the pathological growth ideology of the industrial capitalist society and unjust global exchange relationships. This possibility grew out of a global non-parliamentary movement proposing an alternative society, not just climate-friendly technology (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a).

Within the eco-socialist discourse is where we find elements of ecological masculinity. Author David Jonstad noted that it was the "hunt for economic GDP growth" that drove the consumption of fossil fuels and that only when this was abandoned would opportunities arise to build global agreement on emissions cuts. The big problem was that virtually the entire human race had become dependent on economic growth. Jonstad (2009) saw it as inevitable that the ecological consequences of GDP-thinking would sooner or later force a re-examination of "the social logic of the consumption society", of the global distribution of resources, and of ideas about what the "good life" actually meant. Here Jonstad enacted an ecological masculine position in which the asymmetry of the ecomodern masculinity was criticized. He said we cannot both have the consumption patterns of today and at the same time be sustainable.

Common to the calls for a different politics and an ecological masculinity was the implication that extensive social structural changes were needed because of the climate crisis, and that this was not something that could be achieved through voluntary, individual consumer choices and market solutions. They would require extensive democratic participation, equality politics and politicians who assumed long-term responsibility for the biosphere, even if this meant interference in citizens' consumption habits and behaviour. A leading author and intellectual in Sweden, Göran Greider, said for example, "Transition programs, even utopian, need to be formulated to downshift industrial civilisation to ecologically sustainable levels" (2008, 4). Local experiments of eco-villages, organic food and zero-energy housing were included in a network of transitions inspired by the movement in the UK (Bradley & Hédren 2014).

As outlined by, for example, the Swedish author and scholar Björn Forsberg (2007), the contours of a sustainable social system must rest on the principle that all economic activity that impoverishes ecosystems must end and that the economy needs to be adapted to minimize environmental burdens. The consequence of this was that a number of carbon and energy-intensive phenomena such as air traffic, mining and the long-distance importing of vegetables must end. The economy must return to a locally defined context where the power over production and consumption would be held by members of the local society and not by global market forces. This required circular flows and local and small-scale solutions. This did not mean that national or transnational trade would be banned, but that the needs of the local economy would take preference.

Ecological masculinity and transitional agency

Among others Forsberg stressed that a localized economy was realistic and reasonable for handling the challenge of climate change and that it also had a much longer history; it was also already practised by the majority of the world's people. The big problem was how the downsizing of a fossil fuel based economy would proceed. Two complementary strategies were needed: reform from the inside of the growth economy and the development of "pockets of alternative economic thinking" that could serve as good examples (Forsberg 2007). Ecological masculinity within the climate change debate involved the message "system change, not climate change" and advocated civil disobedience and direct action in order to speed up the system change. The goal was to move the issue of climate change from the closed and paralysed UN negotiations to the alternative forum created by the global climate movement, thereby creating new conditions for achieving equitable and effective climate action (Anshelm & Hultman 2014a). Johan Ehrenberg (2007) touched upon similar ideas when he emphasized the changes made by individual citizens with regard to their lifestyles and consumption in the light of a growing awareness of the need. He also emphasized citizens' increasingly radical and democratic demands on politicians to use public investment to make changes to energy, transport and production systems that threatened basic living conditions.

Discussion: Masculinities in a fossil fuel burning world

Men, and a few women, are travelling around meeting each other on various occasions, in various settings trying to find solutions to global climate change. We argue that continuing this practice is made possible by the hegemony of ecomodern masculinity which recognizes global climate change but at the same time is engaged in different enactments of large scale solutions such as nuclear power, carbon capture and sequestration, carbon markets and geoengineering. What if that is not taking us closer to the solutions, but is the actual problem? It might also be that if the ecomodern masculinity dominates this much we might tend not to recognize

other forms of masculinities and the enactments of, for example, urban gardening, permaculture, r-economy, collaborative economy, etc.?

In this chapter we use an analytical framework proposed by Hultman (*forthcoming*) that suggests that there is more than one masculinity within environmental politics but less than many. We have employed this to analyse the climate change debate. Ecomodern masculinities dominate global climate change debates. This figuration proposes that environmental problems such as climate change should be handled with only a slightly revised industrial modernity, rather than a complete overhaul. Ecomodern masculinities – where toughness, determination and hardness go hand in hand with well-chosen moments of compassion, vulnerability and eco-friendly technology – appear to be the ultimate win-win figuration. But looking more closely reveals a cover-up to continue down the same modern industrial path that created the problems in the first place.

Even though the ecomodern discourse maintains a “business as usual in the form of industrial modernization” attitude, such a discourse is still troublesome for industrial masculinity because ecomodern discourse opens up the debate of climate change as a societal issue that needs to be addressed by industry, politicians and the public. The industrial masculinities figuration has dominated industrial modernization, but this climate change position is not possible to take up without denying all, or most of, the research findings regarding climate change. While industrial masculinity portrays nature as a resource that needs to be tamed and worked with accordingly, ecomodern masculinity is able to depict nature as alive and in need of the care of the market. In both cases nature thus becomes something possible to dominate with masculine practices.

Ecological masculinity does present itself as a possibility in our time of great need for paths to a liveable earth that are in contrast to the industrial and ecomodern masculinities. An ecological masculinity would be part of remaking the economy and facilitate the transition towards a more environmentally benign way of being part of the world.

We suggest there is a need for more research into understanding the values and practices of men, not least because of the large importance men play in shaping, formulating and deciding environmental issues globally. Finding ways of moving beyond the binary of men and women towards masculinities and femininities connected to discourses may create new ways of getting closer to the actual problems and finding durable solutions.

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