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Theoretical Foundations and Practical Guidance

Martin Hultman and Paul M. Pulé

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Martin Hultman

To Elin, for your enduring support and
encouraging me to improve.

To Kaspar, for making me think ahead.

To all my friends, who have listened and shared with me.
To all plants, for providing me with oxygen.

To the oceans, rivers and lakes for providing me with water.
To all Earth Protectors, for showing me that

caring must dare to accompany

the path of peace when life is at stake

... and to all indigenous people from

around the world translating

global climate change into *Bloccadia* for the sake of all life.

Paul M. Pulé

To Mum and Dad, for enduring.

To Leslie, for showing me another world.

To Dottie, for reminding me to cackle at myself

... and to the many other-than-human others that are our
companions on this life-perfect orb floating through space and
time.

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2 Masculine ecologisation

From industrial/breadwinner and
ecomodern to ecological masculinities

... there are some common values ... we need as a foundation for any progressive future we can imagine. One of those values is the elimination of rigidly defined, mutually exclusive gender roles that lock men and women into expectations and behaviours that are limiting and distorted. We will have achieved little if we do not seriously undermine male and female gender roles and must be constantly vigilant to ensure that we do not recreate them in new guises.

(Kivel, 2003: 72)

... masculinity tends to function as 'unmarked'. Because meaning is made through opposition (e.g. the word 'man' and the concept behind it make sense because they are assumed to be not 'woman'), theorists often consider 'masculinity' as one element of a binary opposition with 'femininity'. In the opposition of two elements, one element can be considered unmarked – more frequent or less noticed than its marked counterpart ... women are considered to have a gender, while men are more often considered genderless ... Precisely because a term is unmarked, its silence speaks ... the fact that masculinity has tended to not be thought of as gendered is a hole that should draw attention to its very absence.

(Reeser, 2010: 8–9)

Men, fracturing societies, ravaging Earth

In Chapter 2 we consider the costs associated with male domination by critically examining past and present ways of being male in the modern West. We examine two distinct and pre-existing categories of masculine conditioning that we refer to as 'industrial/breadwinner' and 'ecomodern masculinities'. They represent two 'unmarked' (i.e. normalised) masculine categories whose social and environmental impacts on the planet are obscured by the systems that created and continue to maintain them (Barthes, 1967: 77; Reeser, 2010: 8–9; MacGregor ed., 2017). We follow this analysis by introducing a third relational category based on care for the global commons. We refer to this third and alternative possibility of enacting manhood and constructing masculinities as 'ecological masculinities'. To begin, we examine the constrained socialisations of modern Western mainstreams as a means of providing a context for the analyses that follow.




Figure 2.1 Paul Kivel's (2007) "Act like a man" box

US violence prevention educator, activist and author Paul Kivel (2010 [1992]) has been instrumental in deciphering the role of men and masculinities in justice movements for more than forty-five years. Through his "Act like a man" box (see Figure 2.1), Kivel illustrated the ways that boys and men are socialised to adopt certain sets of predetermined mainstream norms.

Kivel's box of 'manly' characteristics help us recognise that a fuller spectrum of human emotional expressions such as love, excitement, pain, frustration, humiliation, grief, resentment, loneliness, self-worth, compassion, etc., are broadly considered feminine within societies dominated by mainstream norms. According to Kivel, the generalised and traditional messages about acceptable expressions of manhood are clear: boys and men are expected to hold their ground; take charge of situations; pursue lots of women and have sex with as many of them as possible; be misogynistic and homophobic; make money and carry responsibility for their friends, family, nations and their idealisations for the world upon their shoulders. Although Global Northern nations are now predominantly secular, they are also experiencing religious revivals in certain sectors. In those enclaves we can add to the litany of acceptable expressions a man's duty to his God, predetermined by the particular dogmatic messages of his religion as well (a nuance that has gained much traction in terrorism/freedom fighter debates within and beyond the Global North). Kivel demonstrated that mainstream norms are laid into boys and men through some heavy-hitting personal messages. Through his work

and others who have conveyed similar messages (Jhally and Katz, 1999), we are reminded that most males experience these pressures at some point in their lives, making his man box relatable and foreboding for most boys and men. Sadly, while knowing all too well about these characteristics of the man box and being intensely aware of the consequences for them should they choose to step beyond its bounds, few men are conscious of the price they pay for adhering to this social contract. Some of the dehumanising ways that boys and men are coaxed into this box are: 'big boys don't cry'; 'don't be a scaredy-cat'; 'be a man'; 'do the right thing'; 'die for your country'; 'go it alone'; 'be right at all costs'; 'be physical'; 'strong'; 'independent'; 'powerful'; 'in control'; 'rugged'; 'scary'; 'respected'; 'a stud'; 'athletic'; 'muscular'; 'don't be a fairy'; 'tag'; 'wimp'; 'wuss'; 'sissy' and that most insulting of insults, don't be a 'girl'/ 'pussy'/'bitch' (Jhally and Katz, 1999). These are accompanied by more recent vernacular phrases such as 'suck it up'; 'toughen up princess' and 'man up' (Albury and Laplonge, 2012; Conroy and de Visser, 2013). Such messages pervade popular culture and in recent times have been expanded through all-right inspired demands that men dismiss political correctness, discredit and attack intellectuals (esp. feminists), place power and success ahead of care and assume the swaggering attributes of mainstreams emboldened in some of the most influential celebrities and powerful leaders in the Global North (consider the global social impacts of John Wayne, Chuck Norris, Ronald Reagan and more recently, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump), effectively conditioning boys and men to adopt those attributes of the most acclaimed of masculinities that defines mainstream norms (Jhally and Katz, 1999; Kivel, 1999; Kimmel, 2008; Kivel, 2009; Zimmer, 2010; Katz, 2016). These 'strong man' characteristics epitomise mainstream masculinities to this day. The resulting pressures and structural inequities are enormous and entangled, exposing the broader social and ecological consequences of masculine 'boxed' socialisations, in addition to the ways they shape boys and men as individuals as well. Kivel's boxed socialisations affirmed other researchers' contentions that boys and men have been strongly conditioned to perform masculinities within set criteria (Simpson, 1994). Little wonder men are commonly emotionally unavailable in their relational exchanges with others.

The conditioning summarised in Kivel's man box blinds boys and men to their own privileges. This insight is a useful entry point into challenging mainstream masculinities. In this way, we create better conditions for boys and men to unravel their enmeshment with male domination along with the impacts they have on others. Acknowledging self-costs is simply one – albeit a rudimentary – entry point into ending male domination that is worthy of our critical consideration, since it affords us a very personal way of reaching some of the hardest to reach of men – particularly those who are immersed in industrialised and breadwinner lifestyles. There are some very tangible ways that this resistance has come about, resulting in the shaping of men's lives from a very young age. Boys are touched, held and caressed less than are girls; spoken to less and with more harsh tones; bullied or routinely bully others and through that expected to weather violence; told to keep their thoughts

and feelings to themselves (especially pain); expected to perform to get attention; distanced and starved of relational training through expectations that they ought to overcome their dependences from an early age; banter with others by giving or receiving shame/pudor; considered 'not girls' and 'different' from mum while having limited contact with dad or other males; expected to stand on their own two feet – and the list goes on (Kivel, 2010[1992]: 7–8, 23–25; Ackerman, 1993: 125; Kindlon and Thompson, 1999: Pollack, 2000: 17–20; Thompson and Barker, 2000: 10; Meeker, 2014: 10–11, 44; Vaccaro and Swauger, 2016: xv–xvi). Traditional masculine conditioning isolates and prepares boys to become human 'doings' (a.k.a. men as performers) that distances men from their human 'being-ness'. These forms of conditioning are accentuated by the fact that boys have limited access to adult male role modelling, and where they do, the exchange is often with men who are themselves emotionally repressed. For all of these reasons, boys are set on collision courses with emotional emaciation as they become men. These hallmarks of mainstream socialisations form the very bedrock of male domination. Men socio-economically benefit the most from capitalism as well; traditional socialisations like those captured in Kivel's man box are designed to prepare males from an early age to do the structural bidding of commoditisation, effectively industrialising boys to become mechanistic men who are compelled to fall in line, be warriors willing to protect and become breadwinners able to provide for others (Phillips, 1994: 37–53; Jackins, 1999: 4). In light of our concerns for the global commons, we note that the most abstruse versions of mainstream norms, which take these man box conditionings fully on board, manifest as what we refer to as industrial/breadwinner masculinities.

Industrial/breadwinner masculinities

For our purposes, the term industrial/breadwinner masculinities is used here interchangeably with mainstream, patriarchal, hegemonic and normative masculinities (which we apply primarily to men, but also to the masculinities adopted by some women and non-binary/genderqueer people as well). The separation between men and male-dominated cultures stood against otherised people and Earth has been centuries in the making. Building on Carolyn Merchant's (1980) defining text: *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution*, we have noted that men and masculinities have been historically rewarded for pursuing exploitative practices, despite far-reaching social and environmental costs. For centuries, masculine hegemonisation has implemented organised and overt oppression of those who challenged or propped up the establishment – for example, consider the witch hunts of the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment (1600–1800) and the Industrial Revolution (1760–1840).

We use the term 'industrial' to refer primarily to those individuals who possess and manage the means of production and support service corporations who are handsomely rewarded by wealth-creating practices that rely on

extraction of Earth's natural resources. Notably, the term industrial is used here to also emphasise the ways that the broader social and environmental implications of industrialisation are backgrounded for the sake of capital growth. Some examples of these kinds of masculinities manifest through overt roles such as fossil fuel and mining executives, financial managers and bankers, corporate middle and senior-level managers and administrators – the vast majority being Western, white and male (Connell, 2017). We also include the majority of corporate shareholders in this category, given they reap the profits of the companies that they have invested in (Connell and Wood, 2005). Those most strongly bonded to industrial masculinities collectively represent individuals who claim pride of place as owners and/or managers of corporate capitalism; they are typically not only Western and white but tend to be owning- and middle-class individuals who have welded their identities to the dominant social, economic and political systems that operate throughout the Global North.

The term industrial masculinities has been used in educational studies prior to our use of it here (Nayak, 2003). There, references to the term expose the ways that industrial/post-industrial societies affect individual learning possibilities among boys and men who enact industrial masculinities (Stahl et al. eds., 2017: 52–52, 205). However, the categorisation of industrial masculinities is more expansive than that. Judith Stacey's (1990: 267) *Brave New Families: Stories of Domestic Upheaval in Late-Twentieth-Century America* introduced us to the term 'breadwinner' to refer primarily to those working-class men that are typically found at the 'coalface' of extractive practices. Commonly, they are individuals who, for example, toil in mines, work on manufacturing assembly lines, swing hammers, move goods and grow crops. These men and the masculinities they imbue are closely related to industrial masculinities as we have defined it above, but represent a distinct group. Consider copper mining in Australia as that nation's third largest metal ore employer, with up to 92 per cent of the industry's technicians and trade employees being male (Australian Government, 2014). Processing copper results in 99.5 per cent spoil, with the mineral being biochemically extracted from the rock in large sulfuric acid ponds (Wallsten, 2015; Johansson, 2016). Globally, Australia has the third highest reserves of copper ore at 6 per cent, with main deposits in Queensland (Mount Isa) and South Australia (Olympic Dam) and is the third highest producer of the mineral after Chile and the US. Taking the national averages for mining employee qualifications as our guide, technical certificates awarded, high school certificates qualified and school drop-outs represent the top three most populous employment categories in the Australian copper mining industry (Australian Government, 2014). This data provides a revealing example of the ways that an important primary resource such as copper, which causes vast amounts of waste and environmental toxicants, is also an industry employing large numbers of working men – in particular – whose labour creates profits, bonuses and large salary incentives of which the vast majority are divided among industrial shareholders and senior managers who own those means of production.

In reference to both industrial and breadwinner masculinities, individuals may have been born into or worked their way through different socio-economic strata. To mitigate this complexity, our discussion refers specifically to socio-economics and social standing in the present time, looking past class patterns reflective of individual heritage as a complexity that reaches beyond the scope of this book. Combining the two terms into the phrase industrial/breadwinner masculinities represents a category of men who have long been (and still are) enmeshed with industrial-scale extractive processes and services reliant on energy-intensive, profit-consolidating, ecologically destructive and fossil fuel-dependent processes that have been historically created and maintained through colonisation, engineering and technology, neoclassical economic theories and under-challenged social practices. We use this phrase to illuminate the variations of mainstream masculinities that men at all socio-economic levels can and do embrace. We contend that industrial/breadwinner masculinities carry the primary responsibility for humanity's global social and ecological problems, but are not responsible for this alone. This cohort of men and masculine identities are the most representative of modern Western mainstream personae. Industrial/breadwinner masculinities are bound to the pursuits of industrial growth, since the two require each other to thrive (Daly and Cobb, 1994; Friman, 2002). Some empirical analyses of industrial/breadwinner masculinities at both the actor-network and structural levels has been conducted previously (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014b). Such studies note that there are an infinite number of ways that industrial/breadwinner masculinities can manifest in individuals and across industries. Characteristic of primary industrialisation, mining masculinities in Australia cut across class distinctions and remuneration variables, delivering a homogeneous image of the 'Aussie bloke' as one who is white, heterosexual, an epitome of Australian manhood, of working-class demeanour (if not origin), who embodies:

... the mining industry's Australian credentials; to illustrate the importance of mining as a site of employment for 'Aussie blokes'; and as economically and culturally important to Australia.

(Whitman, 2013: 2, 8)

This statement illuminates the enmeshment of corporate systemics with stereotypical Australian mining personae, exemplifying the deep seated significance of industrial and breadwinner masculinities, which is not unique to the Australian mining vernacular, but can be found throughout industrialised settings the world over. This raises a question about the consequences of mainstream norms that industrial and breadwinner masculinities readily adopt. Interestingly, the defining characteristics of industrial/breadwinner masculinities are similar to 'heroic' (Holt and Thompson, 2004), 'hyper-' (Parrott and Zeichner, 2003) and/or 'cowboy' masculinities (Donald, 1992) that have also emerged through the works of other researchers. We have, however, chosen the broader term industrial/breadwinner masculinities to highlight the ways that

masculine hegemonisation, as it pervades industrial Western societies in the modern context, persists across the Global North. By levelling our attention on industrial/breadwinner masculinities, we seek to understand mainstream norms at their very foundations and from there, proceed to disentangle the mechanisms of domination that are adopted by individual men, groups of men and masculine socialisations that result in patterns of internalised superiorisation in their most obscene forms. These then result in some of the most socially and ecologically destructive impacts on Earth, others and self. We consider industrial/breadwinner masculinities as the most oppositional versions of masculinities to the ecologised masculinities we advocate throughout this book. In order to further stress the importance of this point, we draw attention to one of the planet's most pressing environmental concerns, which provides us with a clear example of the importance of developing a critical analysis of industrial/breadwinner masculinities, that being: climate change.

The link between industrial/breadwinner masculinities and climate change denialism exposes a disconnection between modern Western mainstreams and Earthcare. The very suggestion that we live on a vulnerable planet that is being rapidly transformed by anthropogenic factors such as carbon emissions has sparked strong protestations particularly on the part of those who stand to gain the most from unfettered industrialisation (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014a; Supran and Oreskes, 2017). Previous studies demonstrate that climate change denialism is created by small groups of (mostly white Western) men who are intricately interwoven with identities that dovetail with mainstream norms, since, as concerns for climate change gain momentum, climate change denialism, particularly from corporate and industrial allies and beneficiaries, has ramped up to match it (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014b). Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap (2003) noted that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was met by a reflex of conservative political activity (particularly in the US) buoyed by a small group of dissident and contrarian scientists who lent their credentials to think tanks that champion climate change denialism. It is well recognised that to maintain an illusion of intense controversy, industries, special interest groups and public relations firms have manipulated climate data and found ways to capitalise on the media to promote their message across a broad front (Farrell, 2016). Take for example the engagement of APCO by ExxonMobil to confuse public disquisition on climate change that, unsurprisingly, was the same public relations firm engaged by Philip Morris to confuse the health risks of tobacco smoking. Also consider the way that research within ExxonMobil confirms the severe consequences of emissions from coal, oil and gas, but was intentionally downplayed by management in order to extend markets and preserve profits (Supran and Oreskes, 2017). Using these strategies, lobby groups and fossil fuel companies have positioned climate change denialists on an equal footing with international, peer-reviewed climate science experts, even though the proportion of reports reaching consensus over concerns versus denying climate science is a sobering 97:3 per cent ratio – respectively (Cook et al., 2016). The strategy of climate change deniers has levelled at pitting emotive views

reflective of socio-political biases against overwhelming field data and analyses by global experts, drawing on economic and moral arguments as potent cock-tails for confusing the issues. Many of these audible (and mostly white male) voices have participated in generating climate controversy as industry-funded advocates who also hold strong beliefs in global market forces and a general mistrust of regulatory government policies (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014b).

As an additional example, consider Sweden's climate change denials, who have organisational affiliations in sectors where business research as well as science and technology studies meet. Per-Olof Eriksson, a former board member of Volvo and former CEO of SECO Tools and Sandvik, wrote an article in the leading Swedish business paper *Dagens Industri*, declaring his doubts that carbon emissions affect the climate (Hultman and Anshelm, 2017). Ingemar Nordin, professor of philosophy of science, joined the fray by stating that the IPCC's (2014) 'selection and review of scientific evidence are consistent with what politicians wanted' (Hultman, 2017b: 244). Economy professors Marian Radetzki and Nils Lundgren (2009) claimed that the IPCC deliberately cast their models in alarmist direction to intentionally and inaccurately demonstrate that significant climate change was taking place. Fifteen Swedish professors, notably all men, have come out to publicly proclaim themselves as climate change denials (Einarsson et al., 2008). Rather than simply viewing these climate change denials as anti-science or anti-political, we argue that it is important to understand how their very identities as industrial/breadwinner masculinists (even if women) have been shaped by the industrial modernisation movement and why this perspective favours denials' interrogations of climate science precisely because the data affords these individuals at the level of their personal and professional identities (Jorgenson and Clark, 2012). Further, an identifiable convergence of industrial/breadwinner masculinities has recently manifested in neo-fascist/right political movements supported by extractive industries that categorically deny climate science (Lockwood, 2018; Hultman, et al., forthcoming).

Industrial/breadwinner masculinities commonly advocate the wholesale elimination of policies and practices that could otherwise pull us back from a perilous global climatic precipice (Hultman and Anshelm, 2017). Their characteristics are at the very foundations of human social and environmental injustices; these masculinities are effectively the most responsible for human destruction of the living planet. However, there is a second category of masculinities that is distinguishable from industrial/breadwinner masculinities that is also worthy of our consideration. Individuals who adopt the following persona recognise the social and environmental challenges that industrial/breadwinner masculinities have historically ignored or denied. Unlike their counterparts who we have just discussed, this category of masculinities is common among those who assume leadership roles in the fields of local, regional and international environmental policy reform as well as corporations engaged in techno-fixes and clean energy innovations. We term them

ecomodern masculinities. We begin our discussion on ecomodern masculinities by firstly tracing the relationship of this category to ecological modernisation as a school of thought within the social sciences that links environmentalism with economic progress.

Ecomodern masculinities

Another sharp burst of global industrial productivity occurred during and after the Second World War. This was a concentrated period that some refer to as the 'great acceleration' (Coleman et al., 2007: 84). Post-war industrialisation had profound impacts on economic, social and political systems the world over, with the Western industrial means of production (esp. in the US) gathering seemingly unstoppable momentum and global domination. However, only fifteen to twenty years later, evidence mounted that the accelerating abuse of resources to feed industrial modernisation (both in capitalist and socialist contexts) was creating huge amounts of waste and toxic pollutants that threatened global environmental and human living conditions and the long-term sustainability of the planet (Carson, 1962; Nader, 1965; Clark, 2002; Salleh, 2010). From there ensued two more decades of intense clashes between industrial and ecological imperatives, resulting in increased need for social and environmental regulation at the level of local, national and global governance (McNeill, 2000). By the late 1980s, the apparent successes of pro-environmental policy reforms gave corporate and industrial sectors cause for concern that progressive environmental politics might constrain Western industrial development agendas into the twenty-first century if left unchecked (Hajer, 1996). This trend presented financiers and extractive industry owners with the challenge of wrestling back regulatory controls through some green-washed levels of care towards workers, communities and the environment, as a great compromise. Faced with the prospects of accountability for growing problems such as climate change, regulators wedded to global economic management and advanced industrialisation came to the aid of primary production and manufacturing sectors such as oil, gas, mining, steel and coal companies, which have long been complicit in producing the largest quantities of environmental pollutants (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). Such was the ecomodernist response.

Ecological modernisation draws its scholarly origins from the German political scientists Joseph Huber (1982) and Martin Jänicke (1985). The concept was developed further by Dutch sociologists Gert Spaargaren and Arthur Mol (2008). Popularised by growing concerns about the impacts of industrialisation on the planet and people, ecological modernisation provided political reformers with pathways to address the harmful trends of industrial capitalism. Formalised through initiatives such as the Brundtland Report (1987), ecological modernisation aligned with emerging imperatives that not only called for long-term sustainable development policies and practices, but positioned itself as a measured response to growing concerns about rising atmospheric emissions as waste products of industrialised economies, along

with the introduction of micro-plastics and other synthetic toxics into biotic systems. Ecological modernisation was presented as a fundamental reorganisation of the core institutions of industrial society, along with the mechanisms that created and maintained them. This concept can thus be considered an assemblage of organised responses and reforms that pay lip service to the costs of industrialisation on human societies and the ecological integrity of Earth by offering watered-down pathways to protect and preserve economic growth while also offering nominal care for society and environment (Adler et al., 2014). Consider the alarming failure of ecological modernisation that has promoted government-funded corporate energy companies (e.g. Enron) to lobby for policy reform that has effectively sheltered industrialist, financiers and those who support business-as-usual from paying the real costs for their contributions to social and environmental decay – instances of government funded big-business bailouts in times of economic crises abound and appear to have become routine responses to economic crises despite the fact that taxpayer funds are then used to ensure the financial sustainability of corporate elites (Levy and Spicer, 2013). In short, ecological modernist priorities place industrial capitalism ahead of social and environmental imperatives; they are insufficient responses to growing evidence of the unsustainability of industrialisation, designed to placate evidence-based concerns and extend business-as-usual for as long as possible. This reformist approach aimed to tackle our global problems by mitigating threats to industrial growth, the rationale being that profits will be sustained if smart social and environmental regulations are implemented and in doing so would preserve the economic, social and political integrity of corporatised extractivism (Hultman, 2015). In support of these sanguine responses to burgeoning concerns, environmental sociologists, geographers and political ecologists chimed in to ensue discussions, noting that reform policies and practices were not successfully averting the growing gap between humans and nature, nor that emerging between the rich and poor both within and between nations (Swyngedouw, 2010; Blühdorn, 2011). In an in-depth dissertation, Ole Martin Lægreid (2017) demonstrated that the ecomodernist presumption that higher GDP would at some point result in lower anthropogenic emissions, does not hold true. This fact alone is a revealing indictment of the economically suicidal consequences of human-induced global emissions, given multilateral atmospheric regulatory agreements are struggling to gain purchase and the overall carbon (and more pertinently the ecological) impacts of industrialisation continue to rise. Ironically, the regulatory offerings ecological modernisation posited were little felt in Western nations despite them being the largest per capita carbon polluters. Global political and economic machinations strategically deferred the greatest costs and impacts of industrial and economic policy reform to more populous, less-industrialised and poorer non-Western nations of the Global South. Today, with the impacts of climate change upon us, nations such as China, India, Bangladesh and the Alliance of Small Island States (forty-four states and observers from Africa, the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Pacific and South

China Sea) are bearing the brunt of the worst predictions from climate science even though their economic capacities to avert social and environmental crises are substantially constrained (York et al., 2010).

As we identified in the previous discussion about industrial/breadwinner masculinities, ecological modernisation has similarly struggled to free itself from a materialist addiction to growth (Lundqvist, 2004; Hultman and Yaras, 2012). In line with the critiques above, we argue that ecological modernisation has failed because it has implemented inverted priorities, adhering to anthropocentric ideals of moderating human impacts on communities and Earth; doing so by prioritising human needs and wants while sidestepping the intrinsic value of all life. To seriously avert climate change requires prioritising social and environmental care at least on an equal footing (if not ahead of) human interests (or, more accurately, the interests of those select few who benefit the most from industrialisation). We concede that ecological modernisation facilitated some improvements in global social and environmental awareness and activities such as the rise of new industrial coalitions like manufacturing bonded to the renewable energy industries and triple bottom-lining where incomes and outgoings have been audited alongside environmental cost (Ansheim and Hansson, 2011). These are some of the indicators that demonstrate how the reformist approaches of ecological modernisation have combined with neo-liberal agendas over the last few decades, resulting in an obituary of sorts (albeit providing some 'greenwashed' policy and practical reform) that intonates (albeit weakly) an assemblage of tepid sustainable responses to important social and environmental issues (Coffey and Marston, 2013; Morton, 2016: 33). However, ecological modernisation has not stemmed the negative impacts of humanity on Earth's living systems across a broad front. It has levelled too much attention at the machinations of production and trade while offering minimal or non-existent responses to the discontents of working families. This is one core reason for the populist, nationalist, white supremacist uprisings that we are now experiencing throughout the West, raising a key question: despite being a well-intended balance between economy, society and ecology, why did the efforts of ecological modernisation faller so comprehensively? We suggest that part of the answer to this question is gendered, looking to an analysis of ecomodern masculinities to find some answers.

Ecomodern masculinities represents the embodiments of masculine identities that valorise sustainability through ecomodern notions of reform; they collapse social and ecological crises with economic concerns as a supposed balance point between competing forces. While distinct from industrial/breadwinner masculinities in their willingness to recognise global challenges, ecomodern masculinities have emerged paradoxically; aligning global responsibility and determination with increased care for the global commons, but held strictly within the market forces of industrial and corporate capitalism. We argue that this combination is like asking an alcoholic to draft drinking laws. To stress the point, consider the following examples: growth in energy consumption stood against the desire for a stable climate (Hultman, 2013; Hultman and Ansheim,

2017), industrial forestry stood against ecological diversity (Brandt and Haugen, 2000); agribusiness stood against land care and the preservation of farming families and communities (Little, 2002). We contend that the core tenets of ecological modernisation are shackled by a 'masculinist bind' that harbours daring intentions but is socially and environmentally weak precisely because it embraces the 'solipsism of economic reasoning' that Australian sociologist Ariel Salleh exposed when she noted that:

Conventional programs for mitigating the collateral damage of consumer economies – melting icebergs, species loss, pollution induced cancers – simply bandaid a competitively masculinist neoliberal system tailored to production for individual gain.

(Salleh, 2010: 130)

This commoditised deference to selfishness, when combined with superficial attempts to bring about sustainable change, reveals the inadequacies of eco-modern masculinities; a myopia that we introduced above and consider to be a floundering attempt to find a middle path through various conflicting pressures within human communities and between humanity and other-than-humans. We argue for a willingness to challenge not only leaders in important international roles, but the socialisations of masculinities that shape them as well, seeking to expose the structural limitations of ecomodernism at its very gendered core.

There are two telling examples of this masculinist bind that provide additional insights into the limits of social and environmental ecomodernism. We firstly refer to Arnold Schwarzenegger, an individual who became governor of the US state of California (CA is notably the world's sixth largest economy) from November 2003 until January 2011. Nicknamed the 'Governator' leveraged off his role in the Terminator movies, Schwarzenegger provided a telling example of the ways that ecological modernisation and masculinities collide (Hultman, 2013). Given the high level of environmental awareness of the CA state electorate, Schwarzenegger was compelled to find solutions to his seemingly conflicting image problem, since he was readily viewed as the personification of a kind of industrial/breadwinner masculinities, while offering voters a new impression of him as more environmentally friendly. One strategy he employed was to promote a retrofitted Hummer (military vehicle) with a fuel cell driven by hydrogen technology rather than hydrocarbons (in 2017 he retrofitted his Hummer to become fully electric in alignment with the rise in popularity of that technology). Schwarzenegger's metamorphosis to become an 'environmental' warrior-hero was crowned with his role as executive producer and correspondent in *Years of Living Dangerously* (The Years Project, 2014) – a two-season/seventeen-episode documentary focused on the concerns associated with global warming. Schwarzenegger effectively 'tweaked' public perception of his persona; his supposed toughness, determination and endurance were blended with strategically chosen moments of compassion, vulnerability and the pursuit

of eco-friendly innovations (Hultman, 2013). He validated compromise, located himself as a centrist eco-politician while also embracing industrial hegemonisation. Conflating these seemingly disparate characteristics aimed to appeal to Schwarzenegger's Republican base as well as the broader CA state electorate's predominantly progressive constituencies, which served his political career well while in office.

Another Western, white, wealthy example of ecomodern masculinities is that of Elon Musk. Claiming pride of place as a visionary, Musk is broadly hailed as the twenty-first century's smartest entrepreneur and man of great passion for the radical and broad-scale implementation of social and environmental innovations. He is acknowledged for a slew of pro-environmental strategies that aim to 'make the world a greener and better place' by using technology to extend the 'good life' to all (Fiegerman, 2017). Among other innovations, consider Musk's Hyperloop (his version of this technology implements air resistant tubes that transport pods using linear induction propulsion technologies with a prototype intended to link the US cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco announced in 2013). Also consider SpaceX (a California-based aerospace and space transport company that he founded in 2002 that is working to develop space exploration technologies that are intended to enable human colonisation of Mars, gaining notoriety for the development of a reusable orbital rocket called Falcon 9). However, Musk is most widely recognised for his popular (and now financially troubled) Tesla electric car series boasting fully electric sports performance vehicle designs with acceleration and autopilot capacities originally marketed within the \$94,000–140,000USD base-price ranges that now aims to bring this vehicle within the high end of the mainstream new vehicle market. The company is currently promoting a \$35,000USD mass consumer product line in an attempt to right its floundering financial woes while broadening the market affordability of these cars (Ehnerington, 2017). Powerwall is marketed as a domestic green energy accompaniment to Musk's Tesla vehicle series; an integrated solar-powered home battery system pictured on the Tesla website as a discrete monolithic panel powering a modern, spacious, nature immersed, upper middle-class home, through which a Tesla vehicle can be recharging overnight. Through products such as these, Musk has positioned himself as a global environmental champion. He has lead the charge for industrial and technological solutions to growing needs and wants as one of the world's leading techno-fix innovators. However, consistent among all of these innovations is an uncritical approach to the expanding demands for increased standards of living fed by social, economic and political enmeshments with corporate and capitalist growth, all of which are based on industrialisation and the heavy natural resource dependency that they rely on. These technologies are initially expensive, making them exclusive, at least in their earlier stages of development, production and sale. Of course, this severely restricts innovative goods and services accessibility to those with disposable incomes that on a global scale represent mere fractions of the total human population; technologies

that will take considerable amounts of time to trickle down the socio-economic ladder – if at all. Meanwhile, these innovations would rely on ballooning resource exploitation and the production of toxic pollutants that continue to savage Earth's living systems.

As remains the case with Schwarzenegger, Musk similarly continues to sidestep the socio-economic, energy and resource injustices that green technologies like the Tesla electric car series require. David Abraham (2015), author of *The Elements of Power: Gadgets, Guns, and the Struggle for a Sustainable Future in the Rare Metal Age* noted that even solar panels are energy intensive and rare-earth dependent as are many of the essential components of the Tesla vehicles. Economist and environmental researcher Virginia McConnell, who serves as senior fellow at Resources for the Future and professor of economics at the University of Maryland-Baltimore, argued that regional production methods of grid-source energy can negate the greenhouse gas-saving properties of electric vehicles like the Tesla series when those grids are heavily reliant on hydrocarbons: a claim supported by the Devonshire Research Group (a tech company investment firm) since:

Teslas (and by extension all electric vehicles) create pollution and carbon emissions in other ways. Each stage of an EV[electric vehicle]'s life has environmental impacts, and while they aren't as obvious as a tailpipe pumping out fumes, that doesn't make them any less damaging. . . . Your electric car doesn't need gas, but it still might get its energy from burning carbon. (Wade, 2016)

Further, the industrial/breadwinner masculinist appeal to consumer fancies is integral to Musk's business developments. Take for example the marketing strategy used to sell the Tesla electric sedans and sport utility vehicles, which relies on language pitched to mainstream notions of masculinities such as: 'unparalleled performance', 'long range', 'safe', 'exhilarating', 'stress free', 'ludicrously fast', 'quick', 'ample', 'capable', 'uncompromised' and 'real', making no mention at all about how the electricity to propel them is to be generated and shifting focus away from the potential environmental benefits of such a consumer purchase (Tesla, 2017). The mainstream appeal of green technologies encounter their own set of threats to society and environment precisely because they are likely to accelerate individual impacts on Earth's living systems as more and more people gain greater purchasing power the world over. For these reasons and comparable to a greenwashed Schwarzenegger, Musk's technological revolutions continue to over-promise and under-deliver. Like Schwarzenegger, Musk the ecopreneur, the investor, the philanthropist who has pledged to give away 50 per cent of his wealth to charity, the global citizen, the billionaire determined to 'save the planet', the all-round 'simple guy', the man, has embodied the characteristics of ecomodern masculinities to a tee. Our gendered analysis of the Schwarzenegger the warrior-hero holds true for the revered Musk as well, who is similarly failing to deliver effective long-term alternatives to the structural roots of our looming crises.

In the two sections above, we have considered the impacts of industrial/breadwinner and ecomodern masculinities on issues of social and environmental justice. We have demonstrated that in reality, industrial/breadwinner and ecomodern masculinities have courted mainstream norms (and their entwined relationship with industrial extractivism) as their shared hidden drivers. In doing so, both categories have either directly exacerbated social inequities and environmental challenges or failed to seize opportunities to protect and preserve all life for the long term. Clearly another approach to global structural machinations is needed. We explore a path for modern Western men and masculinities that prioritises deeper, broader and wider responses to global social and environmental problems – responses that are both personal and political, individual and systemic and therefore truly transformational. In the following section, we show you a glimpse of what the rest of this book is about; introducing a third category of masculinities that accelerates a shift towards heightened levels of care for the global commons. This, more socially and environmentally connected masculinities, is one we refer to as ecological masculinities.

Ecological masculinities

In the preceding discussion on industrial/breadwinner and ecomodern masculinities, we exposed a common postulate that nature is being overly impacted for human benefit. This has prioritised the wants, needs and desires of some, while others continue to be marginalised. We argue that this is inadequate for humanity and our impacts on the planet. For the remainder of this chapter, we explore what lies beyond the robust industrial/breadwinner and gracie ecomodern options for men and masculinities.¹

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report* (2015) discussed the following development agenda, or Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They are: addressing inequality; managing population growth and demographic structuring; planning urbanisation; establishing and preserving security; encouraging women's empowerment; preparing for the perturbations of geopolitical shocks, vulnerabilities and risks. These goals are designed to steer us towards more sustainable living standards for humanity and the planet and they were intended to raise humanity's levels of care towards Earth, others and self – simultaneously. As we have attested above, all of these measures have been detrimentally affected and increasingly difficult to achieve as a direct result of human induced pressures such as anthropogenic climate change (UNDP, 2015: 70–73). While industrial/breadwinner masculinities have had unapologetic impacts on people and the planet and ecomodern efforts have delivered limited successes across the globe, deprivations on all UNDP counts remain. This calls forth the need for continued creativity as we seek truly effective solutions to the problems we face. Sadly, even the United Nations as humanity's ultimate international regulatory body has been reticent to fully address social and environmental injustices through a frontal deconstruction of hegemonic masculinities and its social and environmental

implications – mainstream norms have remained unmarked even there, approached through concerns about justice for girls and women but not directly analysed as a masculinities problem. This obscuring of a crucial piece in the puzzle of our times has left the role of men and masculinities off the table – the broader care for the global commons that we call for throughout this book being easily taken as an affront to human standards of living rather than calling it what it is: a symptom of internalised superiority that accompanies male domination. We are determined to subvert that trend.

With such an intention in mind, we became interested to explore what masculinities look like when they are not industrial/breadwinner or eco-modern. Our response to our own inquiry has been to examine masculinities and their impacts on men's lives in particular, suggesting that a missing element is masculine ecologisation. Connell's (1990) early examination of ecologised masculinities noted that the values pervading environmental movements could direct men's belief and behaviours towards broader expressions of care for nature, patriots and self in ways that challenged hegemonic masculinities. Connell and Wood (2005) later discussed how alternative masculinities could offer critical resistance to industrial and hegemonic forms of masculinities. Through my doctoral research (Pulé, 2013) (Paul speaking here), I mapped the development of ecologised masculinities from the late twentieth century to the completion of my dissertation in 2013, where I proposed the need for 'ecological masculinism', which is a term I have since dispensed with, as my thinking on the topic has progressed in combination with Martin's and moved beyond terminological associations with mechanisms of domination that an '-ism' suffix suggests. That said, my research did reveal notions of 'ecomasculinities' had received perfunctory consideration by some scholars and activists from various disciplines, but did not develop into a discursive theory on the subject – Martin and I have updated those findings, bringing our considerations of the works of others up to date. Similarly, when doing empirical research on ecopreneurship (Martin speaking here) I came up with the term 'ecological masculinity' reflective of my concerns about the problems and pitfalls associated with industrial and eco-modern masculinities (Hultman, 2017a). My work has similarly progressed to centre on the term 'ecological masculinities' in dialogue with Paul while writing this book (Hultman, 2017b). A more theoretical assessment has also been posted by Greta Gaard (2014), who similarly noted the dearth of analyses on men, masculinities and Earth (also see Gaard, 2017). Previous research on the topic has emerged under various permutations of the singular and pluralised uses of the term, those being: eco-masculinity, eco-masculinities, ecomasculinity and ecomasculinities. These interchanging terms have been further dichotomised by the use of 'ecoman' by Mark Allister (2004), whose ecocritical anthology on men and nature remains the only independent text on the topic to date. Stefan Brandt (2017), Teresa Requena-Pelegri (2017) and Uche Umezurike (forthcoming) have recently expanded on these ecocritical views in separate essays. Further, Sherilyn MacGregor's and Nicole Seymour's (2017) anthology *Men and Nature: Hegemonic*

Masculinities and Environmental Change provides some of the most recent scholarly works on men and nature. We also acknowledge that in finalising this book, after extensive research, we discovered one reference to the actual term 'ecological masculinities' published prior to our use of it here. Professor Wendy Woodward (2008) wrote a chapter titled "'The nature feeling": ecological masculinities in some recent popular texts', in the edited ecocritical volume *Toxic Belonging?* There, Woodward analysed how some authors positioned themselves in connection with ecological thinking and praxes through their constructions of masculine identities. She described the perceptions of Earth, humans and other-than-humans through a gendered lens in a variety of texts noting how this gendering is connected to criticisms of colonially held notions of conservation and hunting as well as traditional knowledges. While Woodward's work is the only scholarly text we could find that uses precisely the same term that we use here, 'ecological masculinities', we note that her emphasis on ecocriticism differs from the meaning we attach to the term. We also take the various references to ecomasculinities introduced above as cursory since they each lack theoretical frameworks for their respective uses of the permuted term. Less direct, but equally worthy of introducing as inspiration for us here are a series of publications exploring the intersecting terrain between men and nature by some rural sociology scholars (Peter et al., 2000; Ni Laoire, 2002; Sherman, 2009) and more specific mention of eco-masculinity in response to disaster management (Pease, 2016; Enarson and Pease eds., 2016) that again do not use the exact same term, ecological masculinities, nor do they provide theoretical framing for permutations on an ecomasculinities theme. These ambiguities highlight the need for a meta-narrative under which these various approaches to the topic can be gathered, examined and debated. Our use of the term ecological masculinities is intended – first and foremost – to provide such a discursive framework for the ways that men, masculinities and Earth are examined.

We introduce ecological masculinities with a keen eye on gender studies (especially profeminist views associated with critical studies on men and masculinities, or CSMN; also see Carrigan et al., 1985; Hearn and Morgan eds., 1990; Clatterbaugh, 1997; Hearn, 1997; Pease, 2000; Hearn, 2004). Ecological masculinities as we formulate it here is consequently positioned as a gathering point for previous conversations about men, masculinities and Earth. Central to our argument is the notion that the Western socio-political landscape of the industrialised north is in great need of a transformation from hegemonisation to ecologisation. We encourage the applications of masculine ecologisation across a broad systemic front, while also arguing the need for this category of masculinities to facilitate personal transformations as well. In Chapter 8, we formulate new ways of configuring masculinities as they shape the lives of men and masculine identities. We also examine the ways that these configurations impact human and other-than-humans as well. Our aspiration here is to bring men and masculinities to the very heart of social and environmental justice.

Conceptually, ecological masculinities stands as a critical alternative to industrial/breadwinner hegemonies and ecomodern reforms. We use the term 'ecological' both scientifically (as a branch of biology that explores the ways that organisms interact with each other and the ecosystems within which they live) and socio-politically (as a movement that explores the relational complexities associated with protecting and preserving living systems on Earth – human and other-than-human alike). My (Martin speaking here) use of the term stems from my analysis of the influence of ecological discourse in the 1970s–1980s in Sweden on the successes and failures of energy and environmental politics. For me (Paul speaking here), the term is a development that builds on my doctoral work, casting a wider net and refining some of the terminology and my analyses of themes to include Martin's important insights on the need for exit politics (from hegemonisation to ecologisation). We use the term 'ecological' reflective of German biologist Ernst Haeckel's first use of the term *Oecologie* in 1866. Haeckel borrowed from the Greek root terms *Oikos* meaning 'the family household' and *Logos* meaning 'the study of'. Charles Krebs (2008: 2–4) defined ecology as a science that examines the 'interrelations of all organisms'. As a science, ecology raises concerns not only about humans and our impact on Earth's living systems, but also about the relationships between the component species within those living systems as well. Ecology can be quantitative or qualitative, helping us to track patterns of interdependency within ecosystems to understand how various species are related. However, ecology also has powerful metaphorical and sociological references as well, facilitating communication within and between species at various scales which have the potential to expose and non-violently resolve discord (Drengson, 2001: 64–65). In this sense, ecology is a science of relationships that can be used literally and metaphorically. For this reason, we use 'ecological' not only as a noun, but as a verb as well, thus: to 'ecologise' or 'ecologisation' are terms used to represent relationality in action. Through the variable implications of these terms, we refer back to the process of relationality in the broader ecological sense. Ecological masculinities, as we use it throughout this book is intended to shift our trajectory as a species towards a deep green future in which we recognise the relationality of humans and other-than-humans alike. Before exploring this notion more thoroughly, we proceed to consider the range of existing views about men and masculinities in masculinities politics.

Note

¹ We use these terms 'robust' and 'gracile' intentionally here, borrowing from Kelton McKinley's (1971) paper on the survivorship of the two varieties of australopithecines categorised under the same two terms, which represent two closely related groups of hominids to our own lineage. McKinley indicated that the gracile lineage of

australopithecines had significantly higher survivorship (22.9 years) over the robust lineage (18 years). We consider these findings (which are of course debatable) apt for our purposes, noting that more caring approaches to survivorship appear to have paid dividends to relatives of our own species for millennia. We take this as further justification for stretching the bounds of masculine care, zooming out further still beyond the constrictions of ecomodernisation in order to accentuate our own and other species' survivorship towards greater flourishing through more caring approaches to the world, each other and ourselves that we consider to be ecological (a.k.a. relational) in the broadest sense of the word. (Pulé, 2003; Pulé, 2013).

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Section II

Four streams